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How is one to interpret the provocative claim made in Hart's second sentence?
Providing a plausible answer to this question has been one of the main projects of modern positivism, and has led to the development of two different streams within that theory.
Those who defend versions of "Inclusive Legal Positivism" often point to the phenomenon Hart describes as illustrating a crucial fact which no viable legal theory can deny: that there is nothing in the nature of law which rules out the possibility that consistency with a moral norm might serve among the conditions for legal validity within a particular legal system. In Hartian terms, there is nothing in the very nature of law which rules out the conceptual possibility that a rule of recognition -whose existence and content are purely contingent matters of social fact -might, as a matter of further social fact, include conformity with one or more moral norms among its conditions for legal validity. Defenders of Exclusive Positivism vehemently oppose all such readings of Hart's suggestion and of the practices it purports to describe. They argue that consistency with a moral norm simply cannot, as a conceptual matter, figure among the conditions for legal validity, and that Hart made a serious mistake in suggesting otherwise.
3 These "Exclusive
Positivists" proclaim the "sources thesis," that the conditions for legal validity must focus exclusively on factors which have nothing at all to do with the merits (moral or otherwise) of the norm in question, else we end up mixing up questions of law and morality which it is the business of law to separate for us. The validity of a norm always depends exclusively on whether, e.g., it has the appropriate source in precedent or congressional legislation. To think otherwise -that is, to think that legal validity could in some way be tied to moral conditions -would force one to deny a number of key features of legal practice. Not the least of these is the law's claim to be a legitimate authority one of whose primary tasks is to regulate and guiding our conduct in ways which allow us to avoid the controversial moral and political questions which dog modern political societies. constituent Bill of Rights as a condition of validity for American laws. But we seem to have a problem here. The American Bills of Rights, as it has been interpreted and applied over the years in adjudicating constitutional disputes, does seem to permit citizens to challenge legal validity on moral grounds. For example, the "due process clause," is widely regarded as specifying a constitutional test of fairness. And it does seem as though these norms of fairness serve just the kind of role that Hart describes, as norms consistency with which is among the criteria for legal validity within the American legal system -just the kind of possibility contemplated by Hart and other Inclusive Positivists.
Now it might seem as though this seemingly undeniable fact is fatal to Exclusive
Positivism. But appearances are said to be deceiving. And it is here that things get very tricky indeed. Contrary to what one might initially have thought, Exclusive Positivists are actually quite happy to acknowledge a thoroughly robust role for norms of political morality in the kinds of constitutional cases Hart mentions. They simply dispute the Inclusive Positivist's theoretical account or interpretation of this feature of legal practice, and the implications, for legal theory, which that account is said to entail. The American rule of recognition does not, via the due process clause, specify fairness as a condition of legal validity. Rather, it specifies a moral condition under which judges are legally required to exercise what Joseph Raz calls a "directed power," 5 to change the law.
On this reading, invalidating it, reading it down, or otherwise restricting its application. The end result?
The existence and content of valid laws still depend exclusively on their sourcesincluding judicial acts of "striking down" -even though moral norms can and do figure prominently in legal decisions, via a system's rules of change, to eliminate or otherwise change them.
Despite its undoubted appeal as a sophisticated theoretical account of an important aspect of legal practice, I remain troubled by the Exclusivist's directed powers account of constitutional challenges. 7 The main source of my discomfort lies in its tendency to run up against key aspects of constitutional challenges -including how legal actors conceive what they are doing when they argue or decide constitutional cases.
These aspects of legal practice sit uncomfortably with the directed powers account. On 6 See The Concept of Law, Henceforth, I will use the phrase 'constitutional challenge' to refer to the kinds of cases to which Hart makes reference -cases in which norms of political morality are invoked in applying an instrument like the American Bill of Rights to address in some way the legal validity of some other norm, e.g., a statute. I say 'in some way' so as to remain neutral as to whether the judge is deciding whether the norm is already invalid or whether it is in need of invalidation. A second key point of criticism leveled by Kramer draws on the fact that criteria of validity within rules of recognition are often multiple in number and ranked in relation to one another. Certain doctrines of federal paramountcy supply one obvious example of this feature. 15 When a rule duly enacted by a state or provincial legislature requires a result which conflicts with another rule enacted by the federal legislature, legal systems often regard the latter as taking precedence over the former. When they do so, this is because enactment by federal legislatures is, in that system, taken to be a criterion of Inclusive Legal Positivism, as understood throughout this book, consists in the following thesis: it can be the case, though it need not be the case, that a norm's consistency with some or all of the requirements of morality is a precondition for the norm's status as a law in this or that jurisdiction ….Insofar as a threshold criterion of that sort does prevail in any particular legal system, then, some degree of moral worthiness is a necessary condition for the legally authoritative force of each norm that is validated as a law within the system.
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According to Kramer's interpretation of American law, it would seem, R can be duly enacted by Congress and yet be legally invalid owing to its actual conflict with a moral norm, N, which (a) has been incorporated into the law as a moral benchmark for validity, and (b) has not been subject to the "piecemeal displacement" brought about by erroneous judicial interpretations of N. To be sure, R will cease to be invalid should a court later rule erroneously in its favour -i.e. mistakenly rule that R is in fact consistent with N. But till such time as that ruling takes place, R is in fact legally invalid.
20 Kramer, Where Law and Morality Meet, 2. Now it is at this point that the Inclusive account runs squarely up against apparent facts of legal practice to which defenders of Exclusive Positivism are apt to draw our attention: barring unusual circumstances, it is likely that rule, R, which is said to be invalid owing to its conflict with N, will nevertheless be accepted and practiced as valid law till such time as a court declares it to be invalid. And of course this is something that may never occur. A court may never in fact have the opportunity to issue a ruling on R's validity because, e.g., no one has seen fit (for any number of reasons, perhaps financial)
to issue a constitutional challenge. Even if such a challenge does eventually occur, and the court does in fact rule that R is invalid, the point remains: despite its objective inconsistency with N, R will likely be accepted and practiced as law, perhaps for decades, till such time as the court issues its ruling. 21 And if law is, as the positivists insist, ultimately a matter of social fact -of social practice -then there is a strong inclination to say that R was actually valid law till the point of the court's ruling, and that it would have remained valid law if no such ruling had ever occurred. In short, R is law if it is accepted and practiced as law, then it is valid law. This important point is one to which Kramer seems rightly sensitive.
Himma…has repeatedly pointed out that norms duly adopted through legislative or judicial or administrative procedures are legal valid before any subsequent adjudicative pronouncements on their validity. Until those 21 I say only that it will likely be accepted and practiced as valid law because citizens and government actors, say administrative bodies charged with implementing R, may well refuse to accept or apply it in the firm belief that R violates N and is therefore constitutionally invalid. In fact, in some instances, courts and other government actors will continue to act in the belief that the law under which they act is valid (or invalid) even after a superior court has ruled otherwise. See, e.g., Cooper v Aaron 358 U.S. 1 (1958) where the state of Georgia refused to act on the belief, endorsed by the Georgia Court of Appeals and, ultimately, the American Supreme Court, that the American Constitution required the abandonment of segregated schools. Cases of "non-compliance" with a superior courts' rendering of a constitutional norm are highly controversial. But they do seem to occur, and they should give one pause in accepting Professor Himma's claim that mistaken judicial interpretations of validity criteria always trump those criteria themselves. provisions of the American rule of recognition. And if one wants to add that this will be so only till a court rules otherwise, so be it. But one must, it would seem, at the very least have to insist that till such a ruling takes place, violation of the substantive moral provision renders the "duly adopted" rule legally invalid -a legal fact which courts are duty-bound to recognize when they consider a constitutional challenge. And so it is natural to read Kramer as denying what appears definitive of the kind of theory to which he purports allegiance. So I am led to suspect that perhaps I have got Kramer wrong.
Perhaps we are to read the phrase "duly adopted through legislative or judicial or administrative procedures" as encompassing the fulfillment of more than source-based criteria. On this alternative reading, a rule "duly adopted" is one which meets all the appropriate criteria for validity -both source-based and merit-based. If so, then Kramer will have remained faithful to his Inclusivist credentials, but at the cost of denying the truth of at least some of Himma's empirical observations -and he does seem to want to grant Himma those observations about American legal practice.
As noted earlier, my principal aim is not to determine which of our two disputants, Himma or Kramer, is right or has the better argument. I'm more interested in using their dispute to bring to light some key lessons we might draw from their lively exchange. That a legal theorist of Professor Kramer's talent should reach a point where he has either abandoned his Inclusive Positivism without being aware of it or has couched his defense in words which strongly suggest that this is in fact what he has done, may
give one reason to pause and take stock. In particular it may lead one to suspect that current debates surrounding Inclusive and Exclusive Positivism have hit a brick wall, and that we need to find terms of engagement which better reflect the insights each side brings to the table. The remainder of this paper represents a tentative step in just such a direction.
C. Legal Practice -Some key observations
Let's begin with some observations about legal practice -many of which figure prominently in the Himma-Kramer exchange. First, some facts which appear to favour Exclusive Positivism.
1. Notwithstanding its actual conflict with a constitutionally recognized moral norm, N, a duly adopted rule, R, will routinely be accepted and practiced as valid law till such time, if such a time ever comes, as R is judged by a court to be inconsistent with N.
2. Notwithstanding its actual conflict with a constitutionally recognized moral norm, N, a duly adopted rule, R, will routinely (continue to) be accepted and practiced as valid law if the highest court to consider the issue rules that R does not in fact conflict with N.
3. Notwithstanding an absence of conflict with a constitutionally recognized moral norm, N, a duly adopted rule, R, will routinely not be accepted and practiced as valid law if a court rules that R actually conflicts with N.
A few observations. First, it should be stressed that 1-3 represent only what is routine or typical. There are notable exceptions in each case. For instance, government bodies could, in the firm belief that it is constitutionally invalid, refuse to implement a rule, R (proposition 1). In respect of proposition 3, Cooper v Aaron illustrates the possibility that a government body can act (or at least propose or attempt to do so) in the firm belief that R is valid, despite a court's opinion to the contrary. Second, in calling a rule 'duly adopted' I mean that it meets all the requisite non-moral, source-based requirements for validity. 24 Third, the practices described as routine in propositions 1-3 are fully consistent with the sources thesis because, in the scenarios described, what counts towards establishing the legal validity of a rule, R, are non-moral facts of legal practice, including the decisions of courts with respect to the validity of R. And finally, the described practices are fully consistent with the directed powers account of constitutional norms such as the due process provision. On this account, recall, a conflict between R and N does not mean that R is invalid; it means that judges are duty-bound to exercise their power to invalidate R, i.e. make it invalid.
Now some facts which appear to favour Inclusive Positivism.
4. Bills and charters of rights are generally taken to contain, and are expressed in terms which strongly suggest that they contain, paramount (moral) conditions of legal validity which have decisive legal force independently of, indeed even when in conflict with, court decisions.
5. In some legal systems, once a court has held that rule R infringes N, R will, for most legal purposes, be treated as though it never were valid law. is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." 26 Adler and Dorf argue that many provisions of the American Constitution have just this effect because they contain "existence conditions" for valid law. For example, …Article I, Section 7 sets forth existence conditions for legislation. If the piece of paper that Smith calls a statute is actually a bill that passed the House but not the Senate, or a bill that the President vetoed, or just a piece of paper on which Smith typed words seeming to grant him rights, then Judge Jones "enforces" Article I, Section 7 by refusing to treat Smith's piece of paper as a statute.
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Some constitutions explicitly recognize this power-limiting, and hence existence determining, role of constitutionally recognized validity norms. They do so by explicitly stating that any product of an attempt to exercise valid government power which violates the relevant constitutional norm is for legal purposes a nullity. It is a failed attempt; an attempt which is, as the Canadian Constitution puts it, "of no force and effect." Some systems give further concrete expression to this claim by requiring, in any case in which a ruling of nullity figures, further steps which presuppose that particular reading of the decision. For example, if the impugned rule, R, is a criminal code provision under which the appellant had earlier been charged and found guilty, the result will not be taken to be purely prospective. Rather, the decision will be that the appellant is not guilty of the alleged crime -he is not guilty because R was not a valid law establishing a legal duty to which he stood in breach. 28 30 I say only that they "incline" towards this thought because there are, to be sure, other possible routes one might take in explaining why, for example, remedies might be thought appropriate, explanations which are consonant with Exclusive Positivism. For example it might be argued that remedies are appropriate because R, though legally valid, was inconsistent with the defendant's moral right, say his moral right to due process. Whether such a reading does full justice to the thought that legal remedies are appropriate even though illegal acts on the part of the defendant took place is a question I will leave unaddressed.
So, we seem to be in a bit of a fix. We seem to have a serious tension between apparent facts favouring the Exclusive side (1-3, which henceforth I will call Exclusive Facts) and apparent facts favouring the Inclusive side (4-6, which, not surprisingly, I will call Inclusive Facts). One way round the difficulties surrounding this tension is to continue to deny one set of facts and insist that belief in them stems from misunderstanding, conceptual confusion, or the effects of misleading language. To be sure, the law often expresses itself very loosely and misleadingly in ways which support 
D: Four Concepts of Validity
In an early discussion of the topic, Joseph Raz introduces us to some important notions which are often at play in disputes concerning the existence and validity of laws.
If we pay close attention to these notions, we may see a way round the current impasse between Inclusive and Exclusive Positivism. Let's begin by noting that Raz, following Kelsen, identifies the existence of law with its validity. 32 To say that a law is valid is to say that it exists -and vice versa. A law is valid, however, only if it "conforms to tests of validity laid down by some other rules of the system which can be called rules of recognition." 33 If it does not conform to these tests -which for an Exclusive Positivist like Raz will all be source-based -then it is not legally valid and hence does not exist.
Furthermore, to say that a rule is legally valid is to say that it is systemically valid -that is, that it ought to be obeyed because it is part of an effective legal system and because of "the need to have effective law and the justified authority of those who make it." 34 So a law is legally valid -that is, exists -only if it systemically valid and is for that reason something to which I am justified in conforming my behaviour -if it actually has the normative consequences for me that it purports to have and hence "ought to be obeyed."
And it is crucial to observe that the 'ought' here is a full-blooded moral ought. "In So (for our purposes at least) the bottom line for Raz appears to be this: if I morally ought not to obey a rule, R, then it cannot be legally valid. And if R is not legally valid, then it is not systemically valid and does not exist. It does not exist even when it is accepted and practiced as valid law within the particular legal system in question -i.e. is "in fact followed." But can this be right? As those who stress Exclusive Facts would insist, a law which is accepted and practiced as valid law does seem to exist even if I ought not to obey it. To deny this seems to flout the positivist's social thesis, the claim that the existence of law depends, ultimately, on facts of social practice. If a rule, R, is accepted and practiced as law, then regardless of whether that acceptance is misguided or misplaced and, morally, I ought not to obey R, the fact remains that we do seem to have law here. We do seem to have the existence of law despite its lack of merit.
Or do we? So far I have been stressing Raz's "natural law" understanding of legal validity according to which to say that R is legally valid is to commit to the claim that it ought morally to be obeyed for the reasons Raz outlines. But let's turn our attention now to another of Raz's claims -one which card-carrying positivists since at least Hart have embraced: "the legal validity of a rule is established not by arguments concerning its value and justification but rather by showing that it conforms to tests of validity laid down by some other rules of the system which can be called rules of recognition." 37 As 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., 150-1.
Raz notes, "normally" these tests concern a rule's source, that is, they have to do with, e.g., legislative enactment or laying down of the rule by judges. But what he does not note at this juncture, and which I think needs to be stressed at this point, is this: these source-based tests of validity are, in their very nature as criteria or tests of validity, such that one can attempt but fail to satisfy them. 38 Should any such failure occur, then, as a sheer conceptual matter, the result must be invalidity. In the case of something like legislative enactment, invalidity must amount to a nullity. These kinds of failures to observe source-based conditions are perhaps not an everyday occurrence, but they do occur. 39 One particularly striking example is to be found in the Manitoba Language Case, where the Canadian Supreme Court determined that over a century's worth of absolutely crucial point which is too often overlooked: the fact that R is accepted and practiced as valid law, and can in that sense be correctly said to exist, does not entail that R actually satisfies all the relevant criteria of validity and is therefore valid law. Yet if we are happy to accept this point as it applies to source-based criteria of validity, then what possible reason could one have for denying that the same might be true when we turn to non-source based criteria like conformity with the norms of fairness contemplated in the due process clause of the American Constitution? Why must failure to meet this type of condition for validity be ruled out as conceptually impossible? 41 We are now in a position to consider some -I hope, helpful -distinctions. They stem from and reflect (though not completely) the Razian thoughts summarized above, and from my earlier analyses of the dispute between Kramer and Himma.
Four Concepts of Legal Validity
Legal Validity as Existence (or Acceptance) 1. R is officially accepted and practiced in legal system, L, as a norm which fully satisfies all systemic criteria of legal validity (both pedigree and merit based) included within L's rule(s) of recognition.
Systemic Validity 2. R is officially accepted and practiced in legal system, L, as a norm which fully satisfies all systemic criteria of legal validity (both pedigree and merit based) included within L's rule(s) of recognition; and does, as a matter of (objective) fact, satisfy all such systemic criteria of validity.
Systemic Moral Validity 3. R is officially accepted and practiced in legal system, L, as a norm which fully satisfies all systemic criteria of legal validity (both pedigree and merit based) included within L's rule(s) of recognition; does, as a matter of (objective) fact, satisfy all such systemic criteria of validity; and "has the normative consequences
[it] purport[s] to have" 42 because it is the product of a legal system which (a) fulfils "the need to have effective law"; and (b) issues from "a justified authority." 43 
Moral Validity
4. R is morally justified on its own terms, i.e., independently of its membership in L.
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A few words of explanation, beginning with legal validity as existence. It's probably fair to say that most modern positivists have, without giving it much thought, simply followed the lead of Kelsen and Raz in treating validity and existence as equivalent notions when applied to law. To say that a law exists, is to say that it is valid -and vice versa. And if, in light of our Exclusive facts, one is inclined to say any rule, R, which is accepted and practiced as law undeniably exists as law, then one will be led to say that R must be legally valid so long as it is accepted and practiced as valid law. This will be one's interpretation of the social thesis -that in the end, law is a social institution, that, as Raz puts it, "regulates is own validity." 45 But if one takes these initial steps, then one will be led to deny that a legal system, L, could treat R as though it satisfied L's very own criteria of validity and yet be wrong about that fact. And then one will be led to a conception of validity which reduces law to little more than scorer's discretion, to treat the law as though it were, on this score at least, infallible or incorrigible. Just as a goal is, in Hart's imaginary game of scorer's discretion, whatever the scorer says it is, a valid law 42 Raz, The Authority of Law, 150. 43 Ibid., 152. 44 It is, in other words, the morally ideal or best rule for the particular circumstances in question -the one which we would choose to adopt if we were unconstrained by prior legal/political practice. A rule which has been duly chosen in accordance with democratic procedures might, e.g., not be the optimal rule from the point of view of ideal morality. But it may, because of its democratic pedigree and because it is morally tolerable, nevertheless have systemic moral validity. I suspect that many if not most statutory laws fall into this category. Legislators tend not to be Platonic Guardians, nor do they labour under conditions and procedures which lead to the same decisions as would be made by Plato's ideal legislators. 45 Raz, The Authority of Law, 150-1.
will be whatever legal officials say is valid. And this will be so even in those cases where the law fails to fulfill its very own criteria of validity -even when, to use the second of our four concepts of validity, its laws are not, in actual fact, systemically valid. But if we separate validity as existence (or acceptance) from systemic validity, then we can intelligibly say that such laws, though they exist because they are accepted (and are, in that very special sense of the term, legally valid) are not, in another very important sense of the term, really valid at all. But because they fail to meet the system's very own internal criteria of validity, they cannot be systemically valid. And one can add, for good measure, that because they lack systemic validity, it cannot be true that they ought to be obeyed because of their status as valid law. A law which fails to meet the system's own criteria for legal validity ought not to be obeyed on the ground that it is valid law if it is not really valid at all. This is not, of course, to say that, morally speaking, one is therefore at liberty to disobey the law in question. There might be good moral reasons -e.g.
reasons resting on the rule of law values cited by the Canadian Court in The Manitoba
Languages Case -for conforming with an existing but systemically invalid law. But the important point to stress at this juncture is that these moral reasons do not rest on the fact that the law in question is one which is systemically valid -one which derives its moral justification and call upon our behaviour from its place within a system which meets the needs invoked in our third concept of validity -systemic moral validity. Any law which fails to be systemically valid, is automatically disqualified from having any such status.
This last point is an important one which natural lawyers have long been keen to stress.
Aquinas tells us that laws which are unjust are not really laws at all; they are acts of violence which no one is bound to obey. But Bentham's talk of terrorist language notwithstanding, Aquinas is keen to add that we may, nevertheless, be required (in his view, by the natural law itself) to conform our behaviour to the unjust law anyway if such conformity is the only way to avoid "scandal and disturbance." The same point can easily be made in the terms introduced here: a law, R, which exists but is systemically invalid may be such that we ought, morally, to conform our behaviour to it nevertheless.
But our reasons for conforming with R will not lie in its possession of systemic moral validity. If it's not systemically valid because, e.g., it was not enacted in both official languages, then our reasons for behaving in accordance with R cannot stem from its being a systemically valid law, because it's not. Our reasons will stem, as the Canadian Supreme Court recognized, from other factors, such as the rule of law values upon which the court relied in justifying its suspension of (systemic) validity.
Finally, we come to the fourth concept of validity -moral validity. That a law exists does not mean that it is morally valid or justified. In other words, that a law is accepted and practiced as valid law in no way entails that it is morally good or justified on its own terms. In this sense, its existence is indeed one thing; its merit or demerit another. So existence does not entail moral validity. 46 Neither does systemic validity.
That a rule, R, satisfies all recognized tests of systemic validity in no way entails that R is morally good of justified. This can, of course, very easily happen if the system in question contains no moral criteria whatsoever. But even when it does, moral validity does not necessarily follow. The demands of morality are often much wider (and more stringent) than the moral conditions recognized in a rule of recognition. This is especially so when those moral conditions have been subject to the kind of piecemeal displacement 46 As we have just seen, it does not entail systemic validity either. functions as a necessary condition of legal validity. We can now see, I hope, the respects in which Himma's inference is warranted -as well as the respects in which it is not. A rule, R, which conflicts with a recognized moral condition, N, can exist as valid law (validity as existence or acceptance) till such time as a court determines that the conflict exists. But this in no way entails that R will be valid in the sense of satisfying the system's very own conditions of validity -i.e., it is not to say that R will be systemically valid. What Himma's analysis fails to accommodate fully, is the law's fallibility. It fails fully to appreciate that the failure of R to meet the system's very own tests of validity must mean that R is, in one very important sense of the term 'validity,' not valid at all.
And it's invalid not because it violates some independent, free-floating requirement of morality. It's invalid because it fails to meet the legal system's very own tests of validity -tests which the system, perhaps fully aware of its own moral fallibility, has decided to adopt as a condition of systemic validity. The test is not whether R is accepted as meeting the system's test; the test is whether R actually does meet that test. Otherwise, as Kramer correctly notes, and as I have stressed in my references to scorer's discretion, Himma's analysis leads to a very unpalatable version of extreme rule skepticism -a version according to which our legal rules are valid just in case their judicial interpreters say they are. If we are to avoid this kind of rule skepticism, then we are going to have to acknowledge the point upon which Hart and Green insist -that the law is inherently fallible. Whatever one thinks of the various distinctions discussed above, they do serve to highlight a crucial point which has hitherto been underappreciated: the fallibility of law is not limited to its moral shortcomings. Law can go wrong in any number of ways, not the least of which is its failure to observe its very own conditions for systemic validity.
Finding a place for systemic validity as well as existence, moral validity and systemic moral validity allows us to keep this crucial point front and centre. does so even though it lacks systemic validity, that is, even though it fails, in fact, to meet a still dispositive condition of its validity recognized by the legal system -still dispositive because that condition has not been displaced by a mistaken judicial decision.
R will, of course, also lack systemic moral validity because it lacks systemic validity, and because possessing systemic validity is a necessary condition of possessing that further
property. It will not be a rule that one ought to obey because it's systemic valid and because it is the product of an existing system of law which meets the further moral conditions specified by Raz. One can say all these things so long as one is careful to recognize that different concepts of validity are at play in these descriptions, and so long as one is careful not to let them run into one another. Helping them to work their way through contemporary debates surrounding the forms and limits of modern legal positivism has helped me sort out my own thinking on these matters. I need to acknowledge a special debt of gratitude to Matthew Grellette who persuaded me of the usefulness of distinguishing between what he calls "existence" and "validity" conditions of law, and of the need to develop a theory which does justice to the insights of both Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism. My distinction between validity as existence and systemic legal validity owes a great deal to Matt's thoughs on these matters. In many ways, this paper is but a footnote to his initial insight.
